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The Impact of Publicly Subsidized Hotels in the United States on Competing Properties 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the use of publicly funded subsidies to encourage hotel development 
in the United States. It reports highlights from the largest and most complete data base assembled 
on these transactions. This data shows that public subsidies play a significant role in American 
hotel development and many projects that are in various stages of the development pipeline 
include the use of public funds. It goes on to present eight impact analyses that look at how key 
performance metrics of competing hotels in various markets are affected when they have to 
contend with new entrants that are subsidized. Three markets saw increases in indexed RevPAR, 
while in the other five markets competing hotels seemed to suffer after the introduction of 
publicly subsidized competition. 
 
Key Words: Hotels, public-private partnership, impact study, public subsidies 
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1.1 Introduction 
The use of various types of public subsidies and financing to encourage hotel 
development has become widespread in the United States. Known generically as public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), we refer to these projects as publicly subsidized hotels or PSHs. As part of 
the background work for this study the investigators identified 118 hotels representing 53,852 
rooms that have received public sector aid that ranges from 5 to 100 percent of the project cost.1 
The mean public subsidy is over 50% and 38 properties are fully funded by the public sector (see 
Figure 1 and Table 1). In addition, ongoing monitoring of news services identified another fifty-
six  communities (Table 2) that are considering or developing hotels that will use some type of 
public assistance over the next five years. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1, TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 The use of public money to either develop in entirety or assist the development of a hotel 
raises many questions. This study focuses on one question that is increasingly getting attention 
and in some cases inspiring lawsuits (Milford and Montgomery, 2011; Mirabella, 2005 and 
Leagle.com, 2007); that is, how are neighboring hotels impacted when they have new publicly 
subsidized competition? There are two opposing camps that frequently square-off in such 
debates. One claims that the hotel is a needed “game changer” and that the market will benefit in 
two ways; first, the new hotel will be a price leader and will elevate prices (Average Daily Rate 
or ADR) for surrounding hotels and second, the new hotel will induce demand in a market and 
attract enough new business to create spillover effects that benefit surrounding hotels. The 
opposing camp claims two negative outcomes from the new hotel; first, public subsidies amount 
to unfair competition by lowering the cost structure of the new hotel and second, the entrance of 
a large publicly supported hotel will hurt neighboring hotels because the existing supply of hotel 
rooms will be diluted with its entry.  An article from a recent issue of Convention and 
Conference Facilities (May 30, 2013, pp 8-9) encapsulates the debate well: 
 
SOME HOTELIERS SKEPTICAL ABOUT MCCORMICK PLAN PLANS  
Chicago, Ill. — The theory behind the city’s push to build 1,700 hotel rooms next to McCormick 
Place is simple: More beds next to the convention center will attract more trade shows, 
expanding the pie for everyone in the hotel business. Crain’s Chicago Business says David 
Friedman isn’t buying it. Friedman, who owns seven Chicago-area hotels, fears the increase in 
supply will depress room rates and profits at existing hotels. And he grumbles that 1,200 of the 
rooms would be built by the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, the quasi-government 
body that runs McCormick Place. “It’s not fair when it’s coming from McCormick Place,” says 
Friedman, president of Skokie-based F&F Realty Ltd., whose hotels include a West Loop Crowne 
Plaza and a Doubletree in Arlington Heights. “That’s not the private sector, in my opinion.” 
Friedman’s views illustrate the anxiety that many local hoteliers feel about the convention 
authority’s strategy, part of a broader $841 million revitalization plan unveiled this month that 
includes a new basketball arena for DePaul University next to the convention center. While hotel 
owners welcome more people visiting Chicago, they like new development about as much as a 
Legionnaires’ outbreak. “Anytime there’s more supply, it’s going to have an impact,” says 
Jerome Cataldo, president and CEO of Hostmark Hospitality Group, a Schaumburg-based hotel 
investor and manager. “Clearly, there are going to be winners and losers.” 
                                                 
1 The U.S. lodging industry has 4.875 million rooms in 51,200 properties according to the American Hotel & 
Lodging Association 2012 Lodging Industry Profile. 
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This study provides new information about the practice of using public subsidies to 
encourage hotel development in the United States. It then presents eight case studies and 
conducts impact analyzes to determine how each of these publicly owned or subsidized hotels 
influenced the performance of a set of competitive hotels in each of their respective markets. It 
goes on to summarize the findings and discusses trends in order to provide a basis for more 
informed decision making regarding these public sector investments.  
 
1-2 What Types of Public Assistance are Being Offered? 
 As can be seen in the data presented in Figure 1, Table 1 and Table 2, the use of public 
money to encourage hotel development is widespread in the United States. Public participation in 
these projects can take two forms. The first is outright public ownership where a not-for-profit 
corporation or other agency of the sponsoring government holds the title of the hotel and is 
responsible for engaging the hotel developer and operator (Hazinski, 2004). The second is some 
type of public private partnership (PPP) where the hotel is owned privately, but the project is 
subsidized by low cost government financing or other incentives. These subsidies can take many 
forms that are detailed by Nelson, Baltin and Feighner (2012). Among them are: 
-  Tax rebates and deferrals including payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) 
- Waiving development impact fees and/or building permits 
- Lowering development costs by subsidizing one or more aspects of the project, 
particularly related infrastructure needed to support the hotel such as roads, parking, 
and utility extensions. 
- Low cost leases or sales of public land 
- Assisting the project with public debt instruments which might include tax increment 
financing (TIFs) 
- Direct subsidies through development grants. 
 
 
1.3 Why Use Public Resources to Subsidize Hotel Development? 
Given the strained nature of most state and municipal budgets it is logical to ask why 
communities choose to subsidize an industry that has traditionally been the domain of private 
sector capital. The most commonly stated reason for these subsidies is that communities look at 
them as investments for which they will get strong returns because there are many benefits from 
tourism that are captured by the host community rather than the hotel developer. Among these 
are multiple tax revenues, job creation, improved performance of a convention center, potential 
for revitalization of the urban core and an amenity that enhances the community.  
 
Tourism is a labor intensive and highly taxed industry so the benefits of attracting more 
visitors can substantially enrich government coffers. In addition to generating sales tax revenue 
for the community, hotels are subject to transient occupancy taxes (TOT). TOT rates of 15% or 
more are common in the United State. The latest TOT tax report conducted by STR Analytics 
(2012, pp. 4-5) for the American Hotel & Lodging Association shows Overland Park, Kansas 
with the highest combined TOT of 17.65% and forty-seven other cities with TOT rates of 15% or 
more.  
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A large hotel is a real estate intensive investment that generates significant property taxes 
both for the hotel and surrounding properties that tend to become more valuable if a large 
convention hotel is able to attract more visitors. A case in point is the Hilton San Diego Bayfront 
which was built on city owned land for which the local government collected no property tax 
prior to 2006. Property tax records indicate that once the hotel was fully operational the situation 
went from no property tax to $5,866,761 collected for that same site in 2010 (Real Capital 
Analytics online data base, 2013 ). While $5.8 million increments in annual property tax revenue 
are rare, this case illustrates just how big the stakes can be.  
 
Other tariffs on tourists that enrich state and municipal governments include airport 
landing fees, and taxes on taxis and rental cars. Tourist spending habits also tend to be high on 
heavily taxed liquor and fuel. Sales tax revenues increase with the additional spending power 
that tourists bring to the region. The jobs created both to build and operate the hotel also drive 
the local economy and tax revenues. Many communities have also added highly taxed casino 
gaming in tourist zones as a way to further enrich public coffers.  
 
 Given the potential revenue streams that a major hotel can create or expand for a 
community, it is not surprising that so many municipalities are being entrepreneurial when it 
comes to supporting these projects. Of course, public subsidies of businesses that are 
traditionally thought of as the purview of private sector capital raise many issues including what 
is the appropriate role for government; what happens when a municipally owned project does not 
perform as expected and equity issues that occur when privately funded hotels have to compete 
with subsidized properties.  
 
This study seeks to make a contribution to the latter of these issues by providing new 
information about how the existing hotels surrounding a new hotel are affected when PSHs open 
in their market. Do these projects induce new demand that spills over and helps raise the fortunes 
of all, do they cannibalize the market with publicly subsidized competition or are there other 
reactions? It also looks at the characteristics of the market for each of the cases in an attempt to 
identify trends that indicate how the addition of a PSH might affect similar markets. This is a 
salient policy question that is being raised in many communities.  We could provide dozens of 
similar quotes from across the country, but this one from Minneapolis / St. Paul regarding a 
proposed subsidy for a hotel to support their convention center is typical: 
 
Opponents, however, say that a 1,000-room hotel would be a bad use of public money and 
would hurt existing hotels by flooding the market with additional rooms and creating unfair 
competition (Vomhof, 2013).    
 
In spite of the importance of how such a property might affect other hotels in the market, there is 
little in the academic literature to guide policy makers on this issue. These impact analyses begin 
to address this gap. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Blocher (2006. p. 139) notes that “(d)espite the massive public investment in hotel 
projects, surprisingly little scholarly literature addresses the wisdom of this public support.” This 
research is an example of an event study which looks at the hotel performance metrics of 
occupancy percentage, average daily rate (ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPAR) 
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prior to and in the months following an “event”. In this case the event is the opening of a 
subsidized hotel. To the knowledge of the investigators this technique has not previously been 
used to look at the impact of a subsidized hotel entering the market, but it has been used to look 
at the impact of other events. Enz, Kosova and Lomanno (2011) used a similar technique to 
examine the impact of the 911 terrorist attacks and the 2008 economic shock on the above 
mentioned hotel metrics for the entire U.S. market. Hazinski (2010) proposes using regression 
models to look at the impacts that the opening of a convention center has on the metrics of the 
local hotel market. 
 
Among those who have addressed other aspects of the wisdom of public support for 
hotels is Sanders (1999, 2004a, 2004b) who attacks the use of public funding for hotels, 
criticizing the practice as not being equitable and provides evidence of publicly supported hotels 
that did not live up to their expected financial returns. Among the underperforming properties 
Sanders cites are the Renaissance St. Louis Grand Hotel & Suites, a Radisson hotel in Myrtle 
Beach that has since changed its affiliation to Sheraton in an attempt to improve its performance 
and the Sheraton Overland Park in Kansas. Murphy (2005) provides a critical review of 
feasibility studies done on PSHs claiming that they are frequently overly optimistic about 
expected performance. Nelson (2006) proposes processes to review feasibility studies for PSHs 
and describes political barriers that make such analyzes rare.  
 
Clark’s (2007) Delphi study found that a headquarters hotel is an amenity necessary for a 
convention center to meet its potential.  He goes on to note that the subsidies necessary to bring 
such a hotel to the market are an additional cost that many communities do not consider when 
they build a convention center. Detlefsen (2012) suggests that open bidding processes should be 
employed to minimize the public subsidies necessary to bring convention hotels to market. Gee 
and Singh provide some non-quantitative guidelines governments can use when considering 
subsidies to encourage hotel development. In these guidelines Gee and Singh (2008, p. 142) note 
that “in most instances, government officials have limited knowledge of the relative costs and 
benefits of using investment incentives.”  
 
3.1 Methodology 
This study began by compiling information on PSHs in the United States with the goal of 
assembling the most complete database on these projects. Hazinski (2004) published a list of 
seventeen publicly financed hotels and mentioned another five PPP projects that involved partial 
public financing. He also identified another twenty-nine cities that were considering municipal 
support for various hotel projects. While Hazinski had not published an update to this list, his 
firm, HVS, had been informally updating it over time. While acknowledging that the list was 
incomplete, HVS was willing to share what they had with the authors. In a parallel effort, the 
authors had started their own data base of hotel PPPs. These lists were combined and then further 
augmented and added to using both published and unpublished records. In addition to HVS, the 
authors obtained data from executives at Encore Garfield Public/Private, LLC, PKF Hospitality 
Consulting, Marriott Hotels and Resorts, Hilton Hotels Corporation and Hyatt Corporation. Data 
from these sources were combined and cross checked to provide the summary data presented in 
Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2. 
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Eight case studies were then selected from this data for the events study. These eight 
were chosen to insure the sample was diverse in terms of geography, brands and market size. 
These properties are listed in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
This analysis explores how the performance of competing hotels was impacted by the opening of 
a PSH. The markets for each of the subject properties were examined and competitive sets 
identified that consisted of those hotels that most directly compete with the subject property. As 
a technical matter, STR Global requires that a competitive set of hotels consist of four or more 
properties to make it impossible to determine the metrics of any one hotel.     
 
The performance metrics for a competitive set of hotels for each project were obtained 
from STR Global that contains data for two years prior to opening of the new PSH in the market 
and four years after the opening of the PSH, provided the property had been open for four years. 
The metrics obtained include the occupancy percentage, ADR and RevPAR for the competitive 
set. These figures are all in nominal dollars. In order to provide a complete understanding of the 
data, each market’s data was examined at every step as it was progressively filtered for inflation 
and then the state of the economy. ADR and RevPAR were first plotted in nominal and then 
constant dollars. Constant dollars were set using a CPI index for all urban consumers obtained 
from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics2 which put ADR and RevPAR in terms of 
March 2013 dollar values to account for inflation. The nominal RevPAR data were then indexed 
to the same metrics for the entire U.S. market to better identify whether trends were the result of 
the new PSH entering the local market or the result of larger trends in the economy. For 
example, an indexed RevPAR of 0.20 means that the competitive set is 20% better than the US 
market, while an indexed RevPAR of -0.25 means that the competitive set is 25% worse than the 
US market. 
 
Finally, a general linear model (GLM) approach was used to analyze the indexed 
RevPAR trends and variability before and after the introduction of the PSH in in each market. 
While it is helpful to look at the interaction of ADR and occupancy as they generate RevPAR, 
when examining the graphical data, the RevPAR metric combines both to provide an indication 
of the overall market. Consequently, indexed RevPAR is looked at alone in the GLM. The model 
used was: 
 
IndexedRevPAR = βo+ β1(Month) + β2(Change) + Error   (1) 
 
where “Month” was a series of eleven binary variables and Change was equal to 0 before the 
event and 1 after the event. Once this GLM was run, the residuals were stored. Least squares 
means were used to get point estimates for the monthly-adjusted means before and after the 
event. A Bonferoni confidence interval was used to get a 90% confidence interval for the effect 
of the change on the mean. A Main Effects Plot was used to graphically depict this change. 
Later, a Leven’s test was used to see if the variances of the error terms had changed when the 
event occurred. Data used were two full years before and four full years after the opening of the 
                                                 
2 www.bls.gov We used series CUUR0000SA0, Monthly CPI of All Urban Consumer, 1982-84 = 100 
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PSH. The data for the month that the hotel opened was not used. The Minitab output from the 
analysis of each market can be found in the appendices.  
 
4.1 Data Analysis 
To get an overall sense of the trends, the monthly operating metrics for the competitive 
sets of hotels in each market were plotted first in nominal dollars, then in constant dollars and 
finally as indexed to the entire U.S. hotel market prior to the general linear modeling analyzes. 
Each of these steps is shown graphically and described in the first case of the Hilton Baltimore to 
document the process. In the interest of space, latter cases are described without including the 
graphs for every step, but they are described within the text and summarized in Table 4. 
 
4.2.1 Description of Analysis Using the Hilton Baltimore’s Competitive Set as an Example 
Figure 2 plots monthly ADR, RevPAR and occupancy of the subject hotel’s competitive 
set for two years prior to opening and four years post opening. ADR and RevPAR are not 
adjusted for inflation, while occupancy is that percentage of the available room nights in the 
competitive set that were sold each month. The date that the subject property opened is indicated 
by a vertical line. This view provides the most unfiltered look at the data. As such, it should be 
interpreted with caution as it does not adjust ADR and RevPAR over time for inflation or 
account for fluctuations in the U.S. hotel market as a whole. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 Figure 3 plots the same data in “constant” dollars. The result of this filtering can be seen 
in the data for the Hilton Baltimore’s competitive set. In nominal terms, the metrics of the 
competitive set appear to be very slightly or not at all impacted by the addition of the 757 room 
city owned Hilton into the market. This same data looks different in the constant dollars which 
adjusts ADR and RevPAR for the effects of inflation.  In this view the competitive set’s ADR 
and RevPar both show a downward trend since the August 2008 opening of the Baltimore Hilton, 
while occupancy (which, as a percentage, is not impacted by inflation) remains fairly constant 
with the continuing pattern of seasonal fluctuations.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 Inflation and the addition of large subsidized hotel into the market is not the only thing 
impacting these figures. Travel is greatly influenced by the health of the economy. The Hilton 
Baltimore had the misfortune of opening in August of 2008 which coincided with the September 
2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy that led to the near collapse of US financial markets. These 
events mark the beginning of one of the deepest and longest economic recessions of our time. It 
should not be surprising that ADR and RevPAR suffered in the Baltimore market at this time. 
One of the things we sought to answer is, are the declines in ADR and RevPAR a result of the 
new competition in the local market or are they the result of the economic recession?    
 
 In an attempt to answer this, the data from the Hilton Baltimore’s competitive set was 
indexed to the performance of the entire United States’ hotel market through the use of a data 
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base provided by STR of over fifty-thousand domestic hotels.3 This indexing adjusts for the 
impacts of the recession on individual hotel metrics and lets us look at changes in the 
competitive set relative to the entire United States hotel market. The results can be seen in Figure 
4, entitled “Hilton Baltimore Competitive Set Data Indexed to Entire U.S.” This view shows that 
Baltimore, like many of our destinations, is a highly seasonal market. In the case of Baltimore, 
the spring and fall are strong with a noticeable dip in the months of July and August. It is also 
apparent that Baltimore’s Inner Harbor is not a popular destination in the winter months as all the 
metrics drop precipitously each year at this time. The numbers for ADR and RevPAR in this 
index consistently outperform the national average. Occupancy percentage also fares well 
compared to the national average except during the winter months when it drops below industry 
norms.  These metrics are all normalized to zero, that is, any number above 0 indicates that the 
competitive set of hotels in Baltimore does better than the US as a whole, whereas, any number 
below 0 indicates that this set performs worse.  As you can see, this set of hotels outperforms the 
US averages in all metrics, the only exception is occupancy, which dips below 0 for a few 
months, notably the month of December. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
 The impact of the August 2008 opening of the Baltimore Hilton is especially evident in 
Figure 4 where the competitive set’s metrics are indexed to those of the national market. In the 
peak seasons the additional room inventory does not seem to influence RevPAR.  But, during the 
slow winter season RevPARs drop to unprecedented lows after the opening of the Hilton. This 
suggests that the Hilton helped attract enough new business to absorb the additional inventory at 
a good rate for the hotels during peak season, but the added inventory was a burden that dragged 
down the competitive set’s occupancies and rates during the winter months. This is a pattern that 
repeats itself in varying degrees in several of the markets looked at in this study. 
 
 These trends, which appear graphically, are confirmed by the GLM. Using month as a 
controlling variable the model finds that the mean indexed RevPAR for the competing properties 
in Baltimore after the opening of the Hilton Baltimore was reduced by an estimated .1387 (a 
reduction of mean Indexed RevPAR of an estimated 7.8 %). A 90% confidence interval for this 
reduction was (.06, .21), which implies that the reduction was statistically significant. The 
variance around the adjusted means was reduced by an estimated 6.9%, though this was not 
statistically significant (p > .3).  
 
 While the competitive set’s indexed RevPAR showed new highs and lows after the 
opening of the Hilton Baltimore, there was also a period of less volatility from March 2010 to 
October 2011 which accounts for the slight, but statistically insignificant, reduction in variance 
around the adjusted means. These can be seen in Figure 5 which charts the Hilton Baltimore’s 
competitive set’s indexed RevPAR and overlays it with the pre and post event means of the 
same. 
 
INSERT FIGURE  5 HERE 
                                                 
3 The index is the ratio of the local market data to the national data. For example, in a month in which the Hilton 
Baltimore’s competitive sets occupancy is 66% and the national occupancy is 60%, the index is 0.66 / 0.60 = 1.10; 
that is, the competitive set’s occupancy is 110% of the national occupancy. 
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4.2.2 Performance of the Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square’s Competitive Set 
 The 300 room Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square and the attached Lancaster County 
Convention Center opened to much fanfare in June 2009. The graphs of nominal and constant 
dollar data collected from the hotel’s competitive set show a cyclical market that consistently 
peaks in August and bottoms out in January. As can be seen graphically in Figure 6 the 
competitive set’s RevPAR peaked at over $111 in constant dollar terms in both August 2007 and 
2008 prior to the Marriott and convention center opening and it never achieved that level again. 
The January prior to the opening, RevPAR bottomed out at $40. January 2010, immediately 
following the opening, the competitive set’s RevPAR was an even lower $34. Based on these 
numbers one might conclude that the Marriott hotel cannibalized the market and took market 
share from competing hotels, but this would be a mistake without filtering for the effects of the 
recession. 
 
 When the competitive set’s performance is indexed to that of the entire United States, we 
get a slightly different story. While the competitive set’s nominal and current dollar RevPAR fell 
following the opening of the Marriott, during its peak season it fell less that than that of the 
market as a whole. The competitive set’s indexed August RevPAR exceeded that of the market 
and reached new higher peaks in each of the two years following the addition of the Marriott to 
the market. Conversely, performance in the trough month of January got progressively worse 
relative to the market in each of the three years after the opening of the Marriott and convention 
center. What we see after the opening of the Marriott and convention center are more extreme 
swings in seasonal performance at the competing hotels. It appears that the convention center 
and hotel are successfully attracting enough visitors in the peak summer months to help all the 
properties in the region. Unfortunately a remote tertiary market like Lancaster is a tough sell for 
meetings and conventions in the winter even with these new facilities. During the winter it 
appears that the additional inventory of the Marriott takes market share at the expense of 
neighboring hotels. 
 
 The results of the GLM analysis on the competitive set’s indexed RevPARs shows that 
monthly-adjusted mean indexed RevPAR in these properties averaged .0699  before the event 
and .0844 afterwards, representing a statistically non-significant increase in mean indexed 
RevPAR of 1.4% (p = .282). ). Variance of indexed RevPAR decreased by 27.6%, yet this 
decrease was statistically non-significant (p = .121). In spite of larger swings post event there are 
a series of spring and fall sholders that can be seen in Figure 7 that impact the variance 
calculation resulting in the statistically non-significant in decrease in the metric in spite of the 
wider range of indexed RevPAR post event. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 6 & 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.3 Performance of the Sheraton Phoenix Downtown’s Competitive Set 
While the pattern of the seasonality is very different in Downtown Phoenix than it is in 
Baltimore and Lancaster, the overall impact of a large convention hotel entering the market had 
strikingly similar impacts on the metrics of competing hotels. The Downtown Phoenix market 
consistently peaks in the month of February and bottoms out in August. There is also typically a 
smaller performance trough in December. Like in Lancaster, the nominal and constant dollar 
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metrics of hotel performance in Phoenix suffered upon the opening of a large PSH. In constant 
dollars RevPAR of the Sheraton Phoenix Downtown’s competitive set peaked February 2008 at 
$155 which is a number that it has not been able to achieve again since the opening of the hotel, 
however it should be noted that the Super Bowl was held in a suburb of Phoenix that month. 
Likewise the troughs of this same metric fell to new lows after the September 2008 opening of 
the Sheraton hotel (see Figure 8). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 As in the case of both the Lancaster Marriott and the Baltimore Hilton, the performance 
metrics of the downtown Phoenix hotels were adversely impacted by the recession. The effects 
of the recession make it particularly important to consider the indexed metrics to get a truer sense 
of the impact of the 1,000 room city owned Sheraton on other hotels in the market. There are 
strong parallels to the indexed metrics in Phoenix, Lancaster and Baltimore. In all these cases the 
nominal and constant dollar metrics of competing hotels suffered after large publicly subsidized 
competition entered their markets, but because of the recession the U.S. market overall was 
suffering. When the metrics of Phoenix are compared to the market as a whole we once again see 
a pattern where indexed RevPARs peak at higher levels during the high season and trough lower 
during the soft season. As in Baltimore and Lancaster the additional inventory of rooms causes 
wider swings in RevPAR. This suggests that the new hotel encouraged business that benefited all 
in peak season, but the additional rooms hurt competing hotels in the off season when a softer 
market could not absorb the larger inventory. 
 
The GLM analysis shows that the mean indexed RevPAR for the competitors’ properties 
in Phoenix after the opening of the publicly funded Sheraton Phoenix Downtown decreased by 
an estimated .0159  or 1.2 %. This change was found to be statistically non-significant (p = .745). 
The variance in indexed RevPAR around the adjusted means was increased after the event by an 
estimated 45.0%, and this increase was statistically non-significant (p > .250). Figure 9 provides 
a graphical representation of these trends. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.4 Performance of the Hyatt Regency McCormick Place’s Competitive Set 
 The 800 room Hyatt Regency McCormick Place opened in June 1998 as a wholly 
publicly owned hotel under the auspices of Chicago’s Metropolitan Pier and Exposition 
Authority. Although it opened a decade earlier than the previously described projects, we can see 
a similar pattern of wider swings in ADR and RevPAR among the hotel’s competitive set after 
the new property comes online.  
 
The nominal and constant dollar data show that the Chicago market follows fairly 
predictable seasonal cycles with peaks in June and September / October as can seen in Figure 10. 
Low points are consistently seen in January. The one outlier is September 2011 during which 
Chicago was affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The competitive hotels’ occupancies do not 
seem to be effected one way or the other by the addition of the Hyatt Regency McCormick Place 
as they continued their seasonal fluctuations within the range of 90 to 49 percent. ADR and 
RevPAR metrics did see wider swings after the opening of the new hotel. These indices hit new 
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highs in the years following the Hyatt Regency’s opening with monthly RevPAR breaking the 
$229 mark in constant dollars three times in the year long period from October 1999 to 
September 2000. The two years prior to the Hyatt’s opening, the same group of hotels’ RevPAR 
topped out at only $211.  
 
While the competitive set saw new constant dollar RevPAR highs after the Hyatt 
Regency came on line, it also experienced new lows. Prior to the new hotel, constant dollar 
RevPAR hit a low of $105 in January 1998. That same metric fell below $100 in three of the 
next four years in the Januarys that followed the hotel’s opening; providing yet another example 
of where the addition of a large publicly assisted convention hotel helps the market as a whole in 
periods of high demand, but hurts during slow periods. These trends can be seen graphically in 
Figure 10 and are also evident in Figure 11 where the RevPAR data is indexed to the entire U.S. 
market.   
 
The GLM analysis indicates that the competitive set’s mean indexed RevPAR increased 
.09058 or 3.9%. A 90% confidence interval for this increase was (.005266, .1759), which 
indicates a statistically significant change. The variance in indexed RevPAR around the adjusted 
means increased significantly after the event by an estimated 59.4%, and this increase was 
statistically significant (p < .04). 
 
INSERT FIGURES 10 & 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.5 Performance of the Overton Hotel and Conference Center’s Competitive Set   
 The data from the competitive set of the Overton Hotel and Conference Center which 
opened in Lubbock, Texas in September 10, 2009 does not neatly follow the trends established in 
the previous four case studies. The nominal and constant dollar data do not show consistent 
seasonal trends like we found in the other markets. There are some irregular spikes in the fall that 
appear to depend on the timing and number of Texas Tech home football games and December 
tends to be slow, but none of these patterns are as regular and predictable as we found in the 
previous examples. Another thing that makes this market noticeably different from the previous 
examples is that both ADR and RevPAR are consistently below national averages. While 
occupancy fluctuates, it tends to do so at and around the national average (see Figure 12). These 
metrics for the competitive set of hotels in our previous examples of Baltimore, Lancaster, 
Phoenix and Chicago on the other hand tended to be slightly to well above the national averages. 
These numbers reflect the composition of the hotel inventory in Lubbock which was made up of 
select and limited service hotels. The desire of the city officials to add a full service conference 
hotel to a community that lacked one was a primary driver of public support for this project. 
 
 From the nominal data it is hard to see that the opening of the Overton Hotel and 
Conference Center had any impact, either positive or negative, on its competing hotels. When the 
data is converted to constant dollars (Figure 12) there seems to be a slight negative trend, but the 
data is irregular and PSH hotel opening occurred in the middle of the recession, so it is difficult 
to draw definitive conclusions from this graph. The data comes into better focus when it is 
indexed to the national market, as shown in Figure 13. This shows irregular metrics with ADR 
and RevPARs that perform below the national market. This is consistent with a market 
dominated by select service properties. In this view it is clear that the opening of Overton Hotel 
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and Conference was not a boon to competing hotels. In fact there is some erosion of RevPAR in 
the local market compared to what happened nationally. 
 
 These findings are reflected in the GLM analysis which shows a non-statistically 
significant decrease in the competitive set’s mean indexed RevPAR of 2.3% (p = .251). On the 
other hand, there was a statistically significant decrease in the variance of indexed RevPAR (p < 
.02). These metrics suggest that the opening of the Overton Hotel and Conference Center hurt the 
competitive set’s RevPAR, but the market became a bit less volatile (see Figure 13). 
 
INSERT FIGURES12 & 13 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2.6 Performance of the Sheraton Grand Sacramento’s Competitive Set 
 The nominal and constant dollar data suggest that the opening of the 500 room Sheraton 
Grand Sacramento hurt the limited number of hotels that existed in the Capitol District at that 
time. Prior to the opening, the metrics for the competitive set of hotels consistently performed 
above industry norms. As illustrated in Figure 14, in the year prior to the Sheraton Grand’s 
entrance into the market, the competitive set’s RevPAR twice peaked (June 2000 and March 
2001) at $130 in constant terms. Additional constant dollar RevPAR highs of $127 and $129 
were achieved the previous year in June 1999 and March 2000 respectively. In the years after the 
opening the highest RevPAR peaks topped out at a mere $113 and $112 constant dollars. The 
December prior to opening the competitive set’s RevPAR troughed at $76 constant dollars. In 
the years following the annual RevPAR lows, which occurred every December, were $65, $61, 
$56 and $63 beginning in 2001 through 2004.  
 
 These figures are even more extreme when they are indexed to the entire U.S. market 
where all the metrics for the competitive set declined following the opening of the Sheraton 
Grand from which they did not recover in the four years following. The GLM results in Figure 
15 confirms what we see in Figure 14. The competitive set’s index adjusted monthly mean 
RevPAR decreased by .1378 or 9.0% after the opening of the Sheraton Grand. This decrease is 
statistically significant (p < .00005). The market also became much more volatile as evidenced 
by the variance in indexed RevPAR around the adjusted means which increased by 49.3%. This 
increase in variance is also statistically significant (p < .04). While the city owned Sheraton 
Grand Sacramento may have succeeded in that it provided additional jobs and tax revenues, by 
all measures the hotel appears to have cannibalized market share from existing hotels in the 
Capitol District. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 14 & 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4.2.7 Performance of the Hilton San Diego Bayfront’s Competitive Set 
 The 1,190 room Hilton San Diego Bayfront opened December 3, 2008 as financial 
markets were falling and the country entered its most recent recession. The nominal and constant 
dollar metrics of competing hotels reflect this. Demand, which is heavily dependent on the San 
Diego Convention Center, does not show a regular seasonality although December is 
consistently a slow month. The competitive set’s ADR peaked at $198 in constant dollars in 
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April 2008 prior to the Hilton San Diego Bayfront’s entrance in to the market and has not risen 
above $179 since.  These trends are illustrated graphically in Figure 16 
  
 When the competitive set’s metrics are indexed to the entire U.S. market (Figure 17) we 
see that collectively these properties consistently outperform the market in all categories and that 
these numbers continue to fluctuate within a fairly consistent range, both before and prior to the 
opening of the Hilton, with the trend appearing to be slightly lower. The GLM analysis reflects 
this with a statistically significant (p = .0001) decrease in mean indexed RevPAR of 13.2%. The 
variance in that same metric increased by 6.4% after the event, although this increase was not 
statistically significant (p > .29). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 16 &17 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
4.2.8 Performance of the L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex’s Competitive Set 
 Those seeking public assistance for a hotel frequently claim that their project will be a 
“game changer” and “rate leader” that will attract new business and drive rates for all the hotels 
in the market, but it is hard to make a strong case that this happened in any of the previously 
described scenarios. The Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square was close to achieving this showing 
a modest, but statistically insignificant, increase in RevPAR. Chicago’s Hyatt Regency 
McCormick Place also seemed to benefit the market as the hotel’s competitive saw a slight rise 
in RevPAR that was statistically significant, but did so at the expense of more market volatility. 
The L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex presents the strongest case for being a 
“game changer” that lifted the metrics of other hotels in the competitive set.  
 
 Trends in both nominal and constant dollars rise nicely for the competitive set after the 
opening of the L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex. As shown graphically in Figure 
18, the year prior to opening the competitive set’s RevPAR spiked once at a high of $144 
constant dollars. After the opening the competitive set’s RevPAR broke this mark and peaked at 
$149 in June 2012. It is important to interpret these encouraging results within the context of the 
U.S. market as a whole. This complex opened in February 2010. Since then the U.S. lodging 
industry has been emerging from the recession. This begs the question, are the competitive set’s 
rising metrics the result of the overall recovery of the U.S. lodging market, or did the addition of 
the L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex drive improvements beyond those of the 
broader national market? The answer clearly seems to be the latter. After the opening of the L.A. 
LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex the performance of competing hotels compares very 
favorably when indexed to that of the larger U.S. market. As can be seen in Figure19, the 
competitive set’s RevPAR index reaches new highs and the RevPAR troughs during slow 
periods are not as severe as they were prior to the opening. The GLM analysis shows a 
statistically significant (p = .078) rise in RevPAR of 5.5% and a decrease in market volatility as 
measured by variation around predicted means, however the change in volatility is not 
statistically significant (p = .240). The L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex seems 
to have grown the market at higher room rates, thereby helping the performance of competing 
hotels. 
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INSERT FIGURE 18 & 19 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3 Summary of the Eight Case Studies  
 This study presents eight different cases, each of which contains multiple data points. 
Table 4 and Figure 20 attempt to pull this data together in a useful manner. Assembling the data 
for all eight cases in these charts makes it easier to examine it for patterns. Examples of patterns 
that one might expect to see include: 
‐ PSHs attract new business and grow the market to the benefit of existing hotels. 
‐ PSHs do not significantly grow the market and take market share from existing 
hotels. 
‐ The impact of a PSH on competing hotels is influenced by the number of rooms in the 
PSH. 
‐ The impact of a PSH on competing hotels is influenced by the size of the existing 
market. 
 
While scenarios such as these have intuitive appeal, none of them is evident in our data. 
There are no clear patterns that emerge from Table 4. There are three cases where RevPAR of 
competing hotels trends higher after the opening of a PSH, and five cases where this metric 
declines. Two of the markets where indexed RevPAR improved were in cities where large PSHs 
of 800 or more rooms were introduced and the other was a smaller 300 room property. Two of 
the markets that improved (Chicago and Los Angeles) are large gateway cities, while the third 
(Lancaster) is tertiary market. There is also no consistency as to whether the rise in RevPAR was 
due to rising occupancy percentages or room rates.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 20 & TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 20 plots the pre and post change in the means of the indexed RevPARs for each 
competitive set against the change in the pre and post standard deviations of their indexed 
RevPARs. This gives us four quadrants that we have labeled accordingly: 
‐ “Game Changers” where the market got stronger and less volatile after the 
introduction of a PSH. 
‐ “Swinging for the Fences” where the market got stronger, but more volatile after the 
introduction of a PSH. 
‐ “Strikeout looking” where the market got weaker, but less volatile after the 
introduction of a PSH. 
‐ “Strikeout Swinging” where the market got both weaker and more volatile after the 
introduction of a PSH. 
Here again there are patterns that one might intuitively expect to see, but none materialized. For 
example, one might think that the markets would tend to cluster in either the “game changer” or 
“strikeout swinging” categories. In other words, there would be some kind of correlation 
between market strength and stability. This pattern did not materialize as every quadrant had at 
least one example fall into its category and no quadrant had more than three examples. While it 
would have been nice to see clear patterns that could be used to predict whether a PSH is likely 
to help or hurt existing hotels in a given market, no such patterns emerged from this study. 
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 One pattern that can be seen in some, but not all, markets is that the RevPAR plots 
showed bigger spreads between seasonal highs and lows once a PSH was introduced. This 
suggests that the addition of the PSH helped attract enough visitors during peak season to absorb 
the additional inventory and created spillover business that benefited other hotels, but this was 
not the case during the soft season where the added inventory drove down occupancies and rates. 
In every case where this occurred, the market could be characterized as highly seasonal with 
predictable times where the destination had very high demand and others where demand could be 
expected to be very low. These trends were evident in both the cold northern markets of 
Lancaster and Baltimore, and in the hot Phoenix market.   
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 There are two opposing sides that frequently square-off in the debate over the use of 
public money to encourage hotel development. One tends to boldly proclaim that the hotel they 
are championing will be a “game changer” that will drive up rates, attract new demand, and raise 
the profits of existing properties. The other side raises concerns about the fairness of publicly 
subsidized competition that will take market share from competing properties whose owners 
invested in the community in good faith.  
 
While the sample size is limited, this study provides a first look at under what 
circumstances each of these scenarios is likely to occur. The “game changer” category is to what 
all PSHs seem to aspire, but it seems to be an elusive phenomena. Only the L.A. LIVE J.W. 
Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex fell into that category with a statistically significant increase in 
mean indexed RevPAR. The Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square also makes the cut in our plot, 
but neither the increase in mean indexed RevPAR or the decrease in market volatility were 
statistically significant. Chicago’s Hyatt Regency McCormick Place produced a significantly 
significant increase in its competitive set’s mean indexed RevPAR, but at the expense of more 
volatility. The remaining five markets saw varying degrees of erosion in their mean indexed 
RevPARs. 
 
 In three of our cases, larger seasonal swings were evident as these convention properties 
tend to attract enough new business during peak seasons to have spillover effects that benefit 
surrounding hotels, but during low season the additional inventory tends to drive metrics of 
competing hotels to new lows. It does not matter how nice your accommodations, few people 
long to be in Phoenix, Arizona in August or Lancaster, Pennsylvania in January. The market that 
fared the worst was Sacramento after the addition of the 100% publicly owned 500 room 
Sheraton Grand. This suggests that in small markets where there are not many rooms, the 
addition of even a modestly sized hotel can erode the performance of competing hotels. 
Otherwise, perhaps the most striking patterns was the lack of patterns that would suggest what 
kind of market is most likely to benefit or suffer from the introduction of a PSH. While two of 
the biggest gainers in mean indexed RevPAR were the large gateway markets of Los Angeles 
and Chicago, a third market that saw gains, albeit more modest ones, was the tertiary market of 
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Those markets whose mean indexed RevPARs suffered the most also 
ran the gamut from the fairly large convention destination of San Diego to the more modestly 
sized market of Sacramento, with the midsized Baltimore thrown in for good measure. The other 
thing that is striking is the geographic diversity of these markets. There is nothing in our sample 
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that suggests that climate, size of the PSH or size of the market can be used to predict how a PSH 
will impact existing hotels. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
 
 This study provides an important exploratory study of how hotel markets are impacted 
when a PSH is added to the mix. The need for information is great given the widespread and 
growing use of public money to encourage hotel development. This study provides eight diverse 
cases, which is a small sample of the known universe of these transactions. Our understanding of 
how markets are impacted by the introduction of subsidized hotels could be improved with 
additional impact studies.  
 
 Furthermore, this study looks at just one dimension of a complex public policy issue. 
There are many aspects of these transactions waiting to be scientifically investigated. Among the 
issues that could benefit from additional research are: 
‐ What is the return-on-investment that communities get from these projects? 
‐ What kinds of public sector investments work best and which should be avoided? 
‐ Is real estate speculation in the form of hotel development an appropriate role for 
government? 
‐ What are equity issues to be considered when some development is subsidized and 
others not? 
‐ What are the best practices in terms of… 
o The use of subsidies? 
o Oversight and decision making processes for these investments? 
These questions and more provide a fertile and largely untilled field for researchers in disciplines 
as varied as economics, law, tourism development, political science, marketing, finance, real 
estate and public policy. This study makes a contribution toward a better understanding of one 
aspect of PSH and hopes to pave the way for additional work in this area. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1 – A Breakdown of Public Funding for Hotels in the United States by Percentage of 
the Project that was Supported by Public Dollars 
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Figure 2 – Hilton Baltimore Competitive Set in Nominal Dollars 
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Figure 3 – Hilton Baltimore Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 4 – Hilton Baltimore Competitive Set Indexed to the Entire U.S. Market 
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Figure 5 – Hilton Baltimore Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR Overlaid with Pre and 
Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 6 – Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 7 – Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR 
Overlaid with Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 8  – Sheraton Phoenix Downtown Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 9 – Sheraton Phoenix Downtown Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR Overlaid with 
Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 10  –  Hyatt Regency McCormick Place (Chicago) Competitive Set in Constant 
Dollars 
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Figure 11 – Hyatt Regency McCormick Place (Chicago) Competitive Set’s Indexed 
RevPAR Overlaid with Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 12 – Overton Hotel and Conference Center Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 13 – Overton Hotel and Conference Center’s Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR 
Overlaid with Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 14 – Sheraton Grand Sacramento Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 15 – Sheraton Grand Sacramento Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR Overlaid 
with Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
 
 
  
35 
 
Figure 16 – Hilton San Diego Bayfront Competitive Set in Constant Dollars 
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Figure 17 – Hilton San Diego Bayfront’s Competitive Set’s Indexed RevPAR Overlaid with 
Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
Figure 18 – L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex Competitive Set in Constant 
Dollars 
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Figure 19 – L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex’s Competitive Set’s Indexed 
RevPAR Overlaid with Pre and Post Event Means for the Same 
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Figure 20 – Plot of Pre and Post Change in the Means of the Indexed RevPARs for Each 
Competitive Set Against the Change in the Pre and Post Standard Deviations of their 
Indexed RevPARs 
 
   Change in  Change in 
   Indexed  Indexed RevPAR 
Market  RevPAR   Standard Deviation 
Baltimore    -7.8%     -6.9% 
Lancaster    +1.4%  -27.6% 
Phoenix  +45.0%    -1.2% 
Chicago    +3.9%*  +59.4%* 
Lubbock    -2.3%    -34.8% 
San Diego    -7.9%*    +6.4% 
Sacramento    -9.0%*  +49.3%* 
Los Angeles   +1.4%*   -29.6% 
 
* = statistically significant at the 95% level 
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Table 1 – Data on Publicly Supported Hotels in the U.S. 
 
Properties Identified as Receiving Subsidies = 118 
Rooms = 53,852 
Public Investment = $8,253.6 million 
Total Project Values = $16,418.4 million 
Mean subsidy = 50.2% 
33 properties (28%) are financed in their entirety with public money. 
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Abilene, TX 300 El Paso, TX 220 Naperville, IL 168
Alton, IL 110 Enid, OK 131 Nashville, TN 400
Arlington, TX 300 Fort Lauderdale, FL 750 New Orleans, LA 245
Atlanta, GA 250 Fort Myers, FL 225 Norfolk, VA 300
Augusta, GA 139 Frederick, MD 200 North Augusta, GA 200
Aurora, CO 1,500 Glendale, CA 173 Oklahoma City, OK 600
Bellevue, NE 150 Green Bay, WI 146 Paducah, KY 121
Bellingham, WA 150 Hollywood, FL 1,000 Portland, ME 110
Boston, MA 480 Houston, TX 1,000 Portland, OR 600
Broken Arrow, OK 120 Huber Heights, OH 115 Rosemont, IL 150
Buffalo, NY 218 Hutchinson Island, GA 500 Salt Lake City, UT 1,000
Casper, WY 200 Joliet, IL 200 San Bruno, CA 131
Cedar Park, TX 221 Los Angeles, CA 250 Savanna, GA 160
Charlotte, NC 1,125 Louisville, KY 600 Seattle, WA 1,200
Chicago, IL 2,161 Madison, WI 400 Stroudsburg, PA 450
Cleveland, OH 600 McAllen, TX 121 Tyler, TX 250
Daytona Beach, FL 250 Miami Beach, FL 800 West Palm Beach, FL 400
Denton, TX 318 Missoula, MT 200 West Sacrameno, CA 343
Des Moines, IA 450 Montgomery, AL 350   Grand Total 23,251
TABLE 2 - Communities Considering Subsidies to Encourge Hotel Development (Reported hotel room count is 
shown adjacent to the city name)
Source: Convention and Conference Facilities Newsletters, December 31, 2012 to June 6, 2013. Mediaventures. 
ccf@ccfacilities.com 
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Table 3 – PSHs Used in the Event Study 
 
Hotel Name      # of Rooms Year Opened  
Hilton Baltimore    757 2009 
Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square 300 2009 
Sheraton Phoenix Downtown 1,000 2008 
Hyatt Regency McCormick Place (Chicago) 800 1998 
Overton Hotel and Conference Center (Lubbock)  303 2009 
Sheraton Grand Sacramento 500 2001 
Hilton San Diego Bayfront 1,200 2008 
L.A. LIVE J.W. Marriott / Ritz-Carlton Complex 1,001 2010 
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Table 4 – Summary of Market Changes After the Introduction of a Subsidized Hotel 
 
Property
Year 
Open
# of 
Rooms
% Public 
Support Occ. % ADR RevPAR
Hilton Baltimore  2008 757 100% Flat Down Down
Lancaster Marriott at Penn Square 2009 300 44% Flat with larger 
swings
Flat with 
larger swings
Slightly up
Sheraton Phoenix Downtown  2008 1,000 100% Slightly down 
with larger 
swings
Flat with 
larger swings
Trending 
down with 
larger swings
Hyatt Regency McCormick Place  1998 800 100% Flat Slightly higher 
with larger 
swings
Slightly higher 
with larger 
swings
Overton Hotel and Conference Center 2009 303 33% Flat Slighlty lower Slighlty lower
Sheraton Grand Sacramento  2001 500 100% Lower Lower Lower
Hilton San Diego Bayfront  2008 1,200 13% Flat Lower Lower
L.A. LIVE Complex J.W. Marriott / Ritz‐Carlton  2010 1,001 32% Higher Flat Higher
Change in Competitive Set's Performance 
Relative to U.S. Market After Opening
